Do Chinese authorities suspect Turkic Muslims inequitably
based on their Islamic religion?

Technology in the form of China's Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP, 一体化联合作战平台, 一بىرلەشمە مەشغۇلات سۇپىسى) has bolstered mass surveillance programs targeting Uyghur Muslims (ئۇيغۇر مۇسۇلمانلىرى, 一维吾尔族穆斯林), and has measured their actions and behavior as suspicious which are not crimes under Chinese law. $^{[1]}$

The IJOP mobile app is used by Xinjiang Bureau of Public Security (police) and other Chinese officials in the lands known by the Uyghurs as East Turkistan/Turkestan (شەرقىي تۈركىستان, 一东突厥斯坦), and perhaps more commonly known to the international world by the name recognized by the People's Republic of China, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (新疆维吾尔自治区, 一شىنجاڭ ئۇيغۇر ئاپتونوم رايونى)–or just Xinjiang.$^{[1]}$$^{[2]}$

The IJOP app demonstrates that Chinese authorities consider certain peaceful religious activities as suspicious, such as donating to mosques or preaching the Quran without authorization. But most of the other behavior the app considers problematic are ethnic-and religion-neutral.$^{[1]}$

[China's current leader, President Xi Jinping] has instituted a slew of national security-related legislation that further restricts people’s rights, has pushed to “Sinicize” religion (that is, exerting greater Party control), and initiated various campaigns to shore up loyalty to the [Chinese Communist] Party.$^{[1]}$

China's actions to "Sinicize"––to make Chinese in character or bring under Chinese influence$^{[6]}$––have reportedly included the mass surveillance of everyone in Xinjiang, however the 36 "Person Types" that authorities are paying special attention to have included direct religious references only to Islam, as recorded in the IJOP app. The app also includes a question collecting the religion of the persons interviewed with a short list of prominent religions practiced in China––Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Other and None as choices––but only Muslims are recorded as suspicious for practicing their religion by Xinjiang police.

These "Person Types" illustrate inequitable technology aided mass surveillance subjective to Islamic religious practice in violation of international protections on religion, including the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which China signed in 1998 but has not ratified $^{[7]}$.

It is critical that the international community economically divest from, and continue and grow financial and export sanctions against China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC), the state-owned parent corporation responsible for the development of the IJOP app and part of a tetrad of Chinese arms producers among the top 20 in the world ${[8]}$, along with the individuals and other official entities held responsible for its use. Although state owned, CETC is part of a Fund I (Big Fund) of China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund (CICF)$^{[9]}$ that connects it to associated ventures that also require the United States' and other goverments' actions to suppress the flow of capital that would fund these religious inequities, even amidst CETC's merger efforts as China seeks to strengthen itself against U.S. sanctions $^{[10]}$.

Data Source(s)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an advocacy 501(C)(3) nonprofit registered organization in the United States. In its own words, "(They) are roughly 450 people of 70-plus nationalities who are country experts, lawyers, journalists, and others who work to protect the most at risk, from vulnerable minorities and civilians in wartime, to refugees and children in need."$^{[3]}$ Learn more at https://www.hrw.org/

Cure53 is a Berlin-based (Germany) information security company that HRW enlisted to “reverse engineer” and produce a technical assessment of the IJOP app and its computer programming source code in 2018. Its work formed the basis of the HRW report this visualization is based on.$^{[4]}$$^{[5]}$ Learn more at https://cure53.de/.

Visualization by Kathryn Hurchla
Assignment 3 - Inequity (The Decision Game), Design Lab: Case Studies, MICA Data Analytics and Visualization__
Updated June 15, 2021

Cited or Referenced

$^{[1]}$ China’s Algorithms of Repression, Human Rights Watch, 5/1/2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/05/01/chinas-algorithms-repression/reverse-engineering-xinjiang-police-mass

$^{[2]}$ Uyghur' or 'Uighur'?, Radio Free Asia, 9/10/2010, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/uyghur-spelling-09062010161733.html

$^{[3]}$ About Us: Who We Are, Human Rights Watch, accessed 6/9/2021, https://www.hrw.org/about/about-us

$^{[4]}$ Cure53: Fine penetration tests for fine websites, Cure53, accessed 6/13/2021, https://cure53.de/

$^{[5]}$ Analysis-Report Chinese Police App “IJOP” 12.2018, Several Members of the Cure53 Team, Cure53, accessed 6/13/2021, https://cure53.de/analysis-report_ijop.pdf

$^{[6]}$ Sinicize, Dictionary.com, accessed 6/13/2021, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/sinicize

$^{[7]}$ China: Ratify Key International Human Rights Treaty, Human Rights Watch, 10/8/2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/10/08/china-ratify-key-international-human-rights-treaty

$^{[8]}$ China is world’s second-biggest arms trader: think-tank, 1/27/2020, Aljazeera, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/01/27/china-is-worlds-second-biggest-arms-trader-think-tank/

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$^{[10]}$ Two Chinese military suppliers to merge to counter U.S. sanctions, by Luz Ding, Published February 26, 2021, https://supchina.com/2021/02/26/two-chinese-military-suppliers-to-merge-to-counter-u-s-sanctions/

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